Case-Law Summary

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E.2022/107

10 July 2025

(Plenary)

Dismissal of the request for annulment of the phrase ‘…and oral…’ contained in the second sentence of Article 10 § 9 of Law no. 2802 on Judges and Prosecutors, as amended by Article 1 of Law no. 7413

Annulment of the phrase ‘…by regulation…’ following the phrase ‘…to be issued by the Justice Academy of Türkiye…’ in Article 10 § 18 of Law no. 2802 on Judges and Prosecutors, as amended by Article 1 of Law no. 7413

-The contested provision was alleged to be unconstitutional on the ground that it did not define, in the Law no. 2802 on Judges and Prosecutors, the fundamental principles and criteria governing the content of the oral examination, thereby breaching the principles of regulation by law, legal certainty, non-delegation of legislative power, and lawful administration.

A. The Phrase “…and oral…” in Article 10 § 9 (Second Sentence)

-The contested provision merely determined the type of examination to be applied to judge and public prosecutor assistants who had completed the final training period, by providing that they would be subject to an oral examination.

-The Court held that the provision did not concern the content, procedures, or evaluation criteria of the oral examination, but solely introduced the oral examination requirement as such.

-Referring to its settled case-law, the Court reiterated that prescribing an oral examination for entry into or advancement within public service, including judicial offices, falls within the legislature’s discretion.

-Accordingly, the Court found that the provision did not, in itself, be incompatible with judicial independence or judicial safeguards.

- Consequently, the contested provision has been found constitutional, and therefore, the request for its annulment has been dismissed.

B. The Phrase “…by regulation…” following “…to be issued by the Justice Academy of Türkiye…” (Article 10 § 18)

-The contested provision authorised the Justice Academy of Türkiye to regulate, by regulation, the principles governing training programmes as well as the procedures for written and oral examinations during the candidacy period.

-The Court emphasised that matters directly affecting judicial independence and judicial guarantees must be governed by law, requiring the legislature to establish the fundamental principles and framework itself.

-It observed that the legislation did not specify the content of the training, the scope of written and oral examinations, or the criteria and safeguards applicable to their conduct and evaluation.

-The Court held that granting regulatory authority without statutory principles conferred an indeterminate and unbounded discretion on the executive, in breach of the principles of regulation by law and non-delegation of legislative power.

-Consequently, the contested provision was found unconstitutional and therefore annulled.

E. 2024/116

10 July 2025

(Plenary)

Annulment of the phrase ‘…or their heirs…’ contained in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Article 6 of the Law no. 5233 on Compensation of Losses Resulting from Terrorist Acts and Measures Taken against Terrorism, as amended by Article 3 of Law no. 5442

- The contested provision required victims who suffer damage arising from terrorist acts, or their heirs, to apply to the provincial governorate within sixty days from the date on which the damage became known and in any event within one year from the occurrence of the incident in order to seek compensation under Law no. 5233.

-It was argued that the provision was unconstitutional as it failed to clarify whether recourse to the compensation mechanism under Law no. 5233 was mandatory, thereby creating legal uncertainty and unpredictability for individuals seeking redress.

-The Court held that the time limits set out in the contested provision directly affected the time limits for bringing compensation claims before courts and therefore constituted a restriction on the right of access to a court, which forms an essential component of the right to an effective remedy.

-Although the provision clearly specified the competent authority and the applicable time limits, the Court emphasised that such restrictions must also be foreseeable, accessible and sufficiently precise to prevent arbitrary outcomes.

-The Court observed that while general compensation claims against the administration are governed by the Administrative Procedure Act no. 2577, which provides significantly longer time limits, Law no. 5233 introduced much shorter application periods specifically for damages arising from terrorist incidents.

-It was noted that victims of terrorist acts cannot reasonably be expected, at the outset, to determine whether their claims fall under administrative fault, strict liability or the social risk principle, as this legal characterisation can only be clarified through judicial examination.

-The Court therefore concluded that the contested provision created a risk of irreversible loss of rights by leading to the dismissal of claims solely on procedural grounds, without providing safeguards to prevent such outcomes, and thus failed to satisfy the requirement of legal certainty.

-Consequently, the contested provision was found unconstitutional and therefore annulled.

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A.E. and Others
2024/5814

28 May 2025

(Second Section)

Dismissal of the individual application due the abuse of the right of individual application

-The case concerned the continued levying of bank and insurance transactions tax (BSMV) on gold purchase–sale transactions via bank accounts, despite the Council of State having annulled the relevant administrative practice and the Tax Administration having notified banks to cease imposing the tax.

-The applicants’ lawyer filed more than 1,600 separate actions, each relating to very small amounts of tax (between TRY 0.50 and TRY 4.00), many of which concerned accounts belonging to the lawyer’s close relatives.

-The domestic courts held, in a number of these cases, that the proceedings had been brought primarily for the purpose of generating attorney’s fees and therefore constituted an abuse of rights, and accordingly refused to award such fees.

-The applicants subsequently lodged 29 individual applications before the Constitutional Court in respect of these proceedings.

-The Court reiterated that the right of individual application may not be used in a manner manifestly inconsistent with its purpose, including through the artificial multiplication of cases aimed at securing unjustified or excessive attorney’s fees.

-It found that the applicants’ conduct did not reflect a genuine attempt to protect their property rights, but rather a systematic strategy to exploit a change in administrative practice in order to obtain multiple attorney’s fees, thereby burdening the judicial system.

-Consequently, the Court has decided to dismiss the individual application insofar as it relates to 366 cases due to the abuse of the right of individual application.

Menduh Ataç
2021/20360

17 April 2025

(Plenary)

Violation of the right to a reasoned decision within the scope of the right to a fair trial, safeguarded by Article 36 of the Constitution

-The applicant was convicted of unlawfully concluding mobile phone subscription contracts without the subscriber’s consent and was sentenced to a judicial fine, despite his defence that the contracts had been concluded by sub-dealers and that he had only performed line activation procedures as the main dealer.

-Although the applicant relied on acquittals in similar cases and on the case-law of the regional court of appeal and the Court of Cassation, the trial court convicted him and imposed a fine without a right of appeal.

-The applicant complained that the trial court had failed to address his arguments capable of affecting the outcome of the proceedings.

-The Court reiterated that, where different courts reach divergent conclusions in respect of the same factual or legal circumstances, the trial court is required to provide specific and convincing reasons for departing from established case-law.

-In the present case, the trial court did not examine whether the applicant had personally concluded the subscription contract, nor did it assess his argument that liability rested with the sub-dealer.

-It also failed to engage with the relevant case-law invoked by the applicant, which indicated that mere approval or line activation by the main dealer was not sufficient to establish criminal liability.

- Consequently, the Court has found a violation of the right to a reasoned decision within the scope of the right to a fair trial.

Musa Özalp
2020/5754

15 May 2025

(Plenary)

No violation of the right to property, safeguarded by Article 35 of the Constitution

-The case concerned the reimbursement of public loss arising from additional social balance allowances paid to retired municipal employees under a social balance contract concluded in 2011 based on provisional articles added in 2016.

-The Court of Accounts held that these additional payments were not prescribed by law and therefore constituted a public loss, for which the applicant, as the expenditure authorising officer, was held liable.

-The applicant challenged this finding, arguing that he was not a party to the social balance contract and that holding him financially liable violated his right to property.

-The Court noted that, under Law no. 5018, the expenditure authorising officer is legally responsible for ensuring that all public expenditures comply with the law, regardless of whether he is a party to the underlying contract.

-By issuing expenditure instructions in respect of payments that were introduced unlawfully into the contract, the applicant failed to fulfil a statutory duty, thereby giving rise to liability for the resulting public loss.

-The Court found that the applicant had been afforded adequate procedural safeguards before the Court of Accounts and that the decisions in question were neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.

- Consequently, the Court has found no violation of the right to property.

E.2024/24

22 July 2025

(Plenary)

Annulment of Article 1 of the Law on Statutory Interest and Default Interest no. 3095, as amended by Article 14 of Law no. 5335

-The contested provision set the statutory interest rate at 12% per annum where interest was due but not determined by contract, and authorised the President to reduce it by up to 10% or increase it up to onefold.

-It was argued that, in an inflationary economic environment, these rates were incapable of compensating for the loss of value of money, thereby undermining property rights, legal certainty and foreseeability.

- The Court reiterated that receivables constitute property for the purposes of the right to property and that interest mechanisms must safeguard their real value against inflation.

-The State therefore has a positive obligation to provide legal mechanisms capable of offsetting the depreciation of money when payment is delayed.

-The statutory interest rate, even when increased by the Presidential decree to a maximum of 24%, was found structurally incapable of keeping pace with inflation, resulting in creditors suffering excessive economic loss.

-The Court further found that neither statutory interest nor existing actions for additional damages provided an effective legal remedy to prevent or redress the loss of value of receivables.

-The lack of a mechanism ensuring that the real value of money is preserved was held to disturb the fair balance between debtor and creditor to the detriment of the creditor.

-It has been concluded that the contested provision, in so far as it applied to non-contractual debt relationships, was held to violate the right to property in conjunction with the right to an effective remedy.

-Consequently, the contested provision has been found unconstitutional and therefore annulled.

E. 2024/151

7 May 2025

(Plenary)

Dismissal of the request for annulment of the amendments introducing mandatory sheltering, euthanasia under statutory conditions and criminal liability of municipal officials under the Animal Protection Law no. 5199

- The contested amendments required that stray animals may no longer be cared for without adoption and must instead be taken into shelters and kept there until they are adopted.

-The Court held that these measures pursue legitimate aims of protecting human life, physical integrity and public health, as well as fulfilling the State’s positive obligations under the right to live in a healthy and balanced environment.

-The legislature enjoys a wide margin of appreciation in determining how risks posed by aggressive or uncontrolled stray animals are to be prevented, including by choosing a shelter-based control model.

-The obligation to place and rehabilitate stray animals in shelters until adoption was therefore found compatible with the Constitution.

-With regard to euthanasia, the Court accepted that, in exceptional circumstances, killing may be permitted where stray dogs pose a serious danger, suffer from incurable or contagious diseases, or fall within non-adoptable categories.

-The requirement that euthanasia be performed by, or under the supervision of, a veterinarian under Law no. 5996 was considered to provide sufficient safeguards against cruelty and arbitrariness.

-The Court further held that local authorities may choose among the measures listed in the European Convention for the Protection of Pet Animals, but must apply the least harmful measure suitable to the present case.

-Resort to euthanasia in inappropriate circumstances may give rise to criminal liability, which was considered an important safeguard against misuse of discretion.

-The imposition of imprisonment on mayors and municipal officials for failing to allocate or properly use funds for shelters and animal care was found to serve the legitimate aim of ensuring effective implementation of the statutory scheme.

-These criminal sanctions were considered to comply with the principles of legality and proportionality, given that the duties, offences and penalties were clearly defined.

-Consequently, all contested provisions were found constitutional and the requests for annulment were dismissed accordingly.

E.2025/28

17 June 2025

(Plenary)

Annulment of the provision authorising the cancellation of provisional driving licences by regulation in Additional Article 17 § 2 of the Highway Traffic Law no. 2918

-The contested provision authorised the cancellation of provisional (candidate) driving licences on the basis of conditions to be determined by regulation.

-It was argued that the acts leading to the cancellation of a driving licence, which directly affect individuals’ private life, must be defined by law and not left to the discretion of the executive.

-The Court held that the ability to drive a vehicle forms part of an individual’s private life, and that its removal therefore constitutes an interference with the right to respect for private life.

-Pursuant to Article 13 of the Constitution, any restriction on this right must be prescribed by law, meaning that the basic principles, scope and framework of the restriction must be laid down by the legislature.

-The legislature may not confer on the executive an open-ended and undefined regulatory power in an area concerning the restriction of fundamental rights.

-In the present case, the law failed to specify which acts or circumstances would lead to the cancellation of provisional driving licences and left this matter entirely to secondary legislation.

-It has been concluded that the restriction lacked a legal basis.

- Consequently, the contested provision has been found unconstitutional and therefore annulled.

E.2025/51

10 September 2025

(Plenary)

Annulment of the phrase ‘…or where the suspect cannot be reached for any other reason…’ in Article 250 § 13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure no. 5271 (as amended by Law no. 7188)

-The contested provision excluded the application of the expedited criminal procedure where the suspect could not be reached “for any other reason” by the public prosecutor.

-It was argued that the law did not specify how the suspect should be contacted for the purpose of offering the expedited procedure, allowing communication by phone, e-mail or other informal means, and that failure to reach the suspect through such methods could unjustifiably deprive him or her of the benefits of the expedited procedure.

-The Court accepted that the rule pursued a legitimate aim, namely ensuring the effective and timely conduct of criminal proceedings and preventing procedural deadlock.

-However, the expedited procedure produces significant advantages for the suspect, in particular a reduction of the penalty by half, making effective notification and the suspect’s informed participation a decisive safeguard.

-The Court found that the Code of Criminal Procedure did not regulate the method of invitation to the suspect, nor did it require formal service of notice under the Law on Notification, and did not provide any judicial review of the prosecutor’s decision stating that the suspect could not be reached.

- Moreover, the legislation did not establish any effective procedural mechanism enabling the suspect to challenge the assessment that he or she could not be reached, or to have the expedited procedure applied at a later stage of the proceedings.

- As a result, the contested provision placed an excessive and disproportionate burden on the suspect by depriving the person concerned of a legally significant procedural advantage without sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness.

-The Court therefore held that excluding the expedited procedure solely on the ground that the suspect could not be reached “for any other reason” was incompatible with the principle of proportionality inherent in the rule of law.

-Consequently, the contested provision has been found unconstitutional and therefore annulled.

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E. 2025/133

22 July 2025

(Plenary)

Dismissal of the application for the annulment and suspension of execution of the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s Decision no. 1450 of 21 May 2025 concerning the election of members of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors

- The application sought the annulment and suspension of execution of the decision of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) concerning the election of members of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (CJP).

- It was alleged that the impugned TGNA decision violated several constitutional provisions, including the principles of the rule of law, judicial independence and separation of powers.

- The Court recalled that, pursuant to Articles 148 and 85 of the Constitution, only laws, presidential decrees and the Rules of Procedure of the TGNA, as well as decisions on lifting parliamentary immunity or loss of membership, fall within its jurisdiction of constitutionality review.

- The Court reiterated its established case-law according to which the constitutionality review of TGNA decisions is possible only where such decisions, by their content, legal nature, effect and consequences, are equivalent to rules of procedure of the TGNA.

-In this regard, only TGNA decisions that regulate the working procedures and internal functioning of the Parliament may be regarded as having the nature of a Rules of Procedure provision and thus be subject to constitutionality review.

-The Court emphasised that extending constitutionality review to TGNA decisions not relating to parliamentary procedure, solely on the basis of alleged procedural irregularities in their adoption, would exceed its constitutionally defined powers.

-The impugned TGNA decision concerned the exercise of Parliament’s constitutional authority to elect certain members of the CJP under Article 159 of the Constitution.

-As the decision did not regulate the working procedures or internal rules of the TGNA, it could not be characterised as an implicit amendment to the Rules of Procedure.

- The Court held that the impugned Grand National Assembly decision, which merely concerned the exercise of Parliament’s constitutional power to elect members of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors, did not regulate parliamentary procedure and therefore fell outside the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction of constitutionality review.

- Consequently, the Court dismissed the request for annulment.

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Sait Görmüş
2022/19376

12 December 2024 (Plenary)

Violation of the right to an effective remedy safeguarded by Article 40 of the Constitution, in conjunction with the right to property safeguarded by Article 35 of the Constitution

-Alleged violation of the right to an effective remedy, in conjunction with the right to property, due to the excessive duration of a seizure implemented through an annotation in the vehicle registration record.

-The applicant’s vehicle was seized in 2010 in the context of criminal proceedings against third parties, and although confiscation was repeatedly rejected by the trial courts, the seizure remained in place for approximately thirteen years.

-Following the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings due to the statute of limitations, the annotation on the vehicle registration record was removed only in December 2023.

-The Constitutional Court observed that while Article 141 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides a compensation remedy for unlawful or excessive seizures, however established case-law excludes seizures carried out solely by way of registration annotations from its scope.

-The Constitutional Court further held that the prolonged duration of the measure, despite the absence of any fault attributable to the applicant, resulted in damage exceeding what was inevitable and imposed an excessive burden on him.

-In the absence of any legal mechanism capable of providing compensation for such damage, the applicant was deprived of an effective remedy to challenge the consequences of the prolonged restriction.

-Accordingly, the Constitutional Court found a violation of the right to an effective remedy, in conjunction with the right to property, and decided to apply the pilot judgment procedure.

E. 2024/211

3 June 2025

(Plenary)

Annulment of the phrase “…or those who undertake to pay 25% of the technical infrastructure fee in advance and the remaining 75% within six months from the date on which the relevant administration completes the infrastructure service, in the manner specified in the regulation…” in the first sentence of the second paragraph of Article 23 of the Zoning Law no. 3194

- The contested provision required applicants seeking a building permit in development areas lacking technical infrastructure to pay 25% of the technical infrastructure fee in advance and to undertake to pay the remaining 75% within a specified period.

- It was alleged that the impugned provision imposed a financial obligation akin to a charge or levy without defining, at the statutory level, the method, criteria or limits for determining the amount of the infrastructure fee.

- The Court observed that the technical infrastructure fee was intended to cover the costs of public services such as roads, sewage and water networks in undeveloped areas.

- However, the provision failed to lay down any statutory criteria governing the calculation of the fee, leaving its determination entirely to the discretion of the administrative authorities through secondary regulations.

-The Court further emphasised that a financial burden directly affecting the use and enjoyment of property may be imposed only on the basis of clear, foreseeable and sufficiently precise statutory rules.

- The Court held that granting the executive an unbounded and undefined discretionary power to determine a financial burden affecting property rights was incompatible with the principle that restrictions on property rights must be prescribed by law.

- Consequently, the contested provision has been found unconstitutional and therefore annulled.

E. 2024/75

17 June 2025

(Plenary)

Annulment of paragraph (1) of Additional Article 1 of the Law on the Establishment and Duties of the Turkish Football Federation no. 5894, as inserted by Article 29 of Law no. 7346

-The contested provision regulated the procedures and principles for blocking access to online broadcasts of football matches made available unlawfully within the territory of Türkiye, including blocking specific content or, where necessary, entire websites.

-It was alleged that the provision empowered a body outside the judiciary to interfere with freedom of expression, without requiring prior judicial authorisation or providing safeguards against arbitrary application.

-The Court noted that the blocking of access constitutes a severe interference with freedom of expression, which must be accompanied by strict procedural guarantees, including effective judicial oversight.

-Although the Turkish Football Federation (TFF) has the status of a public legal entity, the law failed to lay down statutory criteria concerning the composition, qualifications and independence of its decision-making bodies authorised to order access blocking.

-The provision further allowed the delegation of this power to an administrative unit without establishing guarantees to prevent arbitrary use of the authority and without ministerial supervision.

-The Court also found that the judicial remedy provided against access-blocking decisions lacked effective procedural safeguards, notably due to the absence of provisions on notification and the uncertainty surrounding the starting point of the time-limit for judicial review.

-Accordingly, the Constitutional Court concluded that the restriction on freedom of expression did not satisfy the requirement of lawfulness.

 - Consequently, the contested provision has been found unconstitutional and therefore annulled.

E. 2024/157

3 June 2025

(Plenary)

Annulment of paragraph (15) of Article 3 of the Labour Courts Law no. 7036

-The contested provision required that, in cases involving a principal employer–subcontractor relationship, both employers participate jointly in mediation proceedings for an agreement to be reached in applications concerning reinstatement claims.

-It was alleged that obliging employees to apply to mediation against both the principal employer and the subcontractor imposed an excessive and unreasonable burden, as the existence of such a relationship may not always be known or ascertainable by the employee.

-The Court observed that the impugned provision required employees to identify and prove a legal relationship to which they were not a party before initiating mediation, failing which may result with subsequent court action dismissal on procedural grounds.

-Given that the legal relationship between the principal employer and the subcontractor is not necessarily transparent or publicly disclosed, the employee may be unable to fulfil this requirement.

-The provision did not allow the employee to continue the proceedings where the existence of a principal employer–subcontractor relationship was established only at the judicial stage.

-The Court held that imposing such an obligation placed a disproportionate burden on employees seeking reinstatement and constituted a violation of the principle of proportionality within the scope of the right to a fair trial.

- Consequently, the contested provision has been found unconstitutional and therefore annulled.

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Caner Şafak
2024/41763

8 July 2025

(Plenary)

Violation of the right to an effective remedy, safeguarded by Article 40 of the Constitution, in conjunction with the right to property safeguarded by Article 35 of the Constitution

- Alleged violation of the right to an effective remedy, in conjunction with the right to property, on account of the failure to compensate for the loss of value of a receivable caused by inflation.

-The applicant initiated enforcement proceedings in 2010 to recover a housing-loan-related receivable, which were suspended following the debtor bank’s objection, and subsequently obtained a final judgment ordering payment of the principal amount together with statutory default interest.

-The judgment became final in July 2020, and the debt was paid after a delay of nearly ten years, during which statutory interest at a fixed rate was applied.

-Although statutory interest and enforcement denial compensation were awarded, the interest rate remained significantly below inflation rates throughout the relevant period, resulting in a substantial loss of value of the applicant’s receivable.

-The applicant’s claim for further damages, brought under the Turkish Code of Obligations on the ground that statutory interest failed to offset inflation-related loss, was dismissed by the domestic courts with final effect.

-The Court held that failure to compensate the loss of value caused by inflation disrupts the fair balance between debtor and creditor and imposes an excessive burden on the creditor.

-The Court observed that neither the statutory interest regime under Law no. 3095 nor actions for further damages under domestic law provide, in theory or in practice, an effective remedy capable of offering a reasonable prospect of success in compensating losses caused by inflation.

- Accordingly, the Constitutional Court found a violation of the right to an effective remedy, in conjunction with the right to property, and decided to apply the pilot judgment procedure.

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Hülya Şimşek
2022/18821

20 March 2025 (Plenary)

Violation of the right to trade union freedom safeguarded by Article 51 of the Constitution

- Alleged violation of the right to trade union freedom on account of the applicant’s exclusion from the scope of collective labour agreements (CLAs) concluded at the workplace.

- The applicant, a union member employed as an accounting supervisor, was classified as a white-collar employee and therefore deprived of the benefits arising from successive CLAs concluded during her employment.

- The domestic labour courts dismissed the applicant’s claims, holding that none of the out-of-scope white-collar employees benefited from the CLAs, without examining the applicant’s actual duties, responsibilities or position within the organisational structure.

- The Constitutional Court reiterated that the right to conclude CLAs under Articles 51 and 53 of the Constitution necessarily encompasses the right to benefit from such agreements, and that exclusions are permissible only for employer representatives or those participating in negotiations on behalf of the employer.

- In the absence of concrete findings demonstrating that the applicant fell within any statutory exception, the restrictive interpretation adopted by the domestic courts was found to lack relevant and sufficient reasoning.

- Accordingly, the Constitutional Court held that the State failed to fulfil its positive obligations and found a violation of the right to trade union freedom.

E. 2024/237

17 June 2025

(Plenary)

Annulment of the phrase “…and this decision shall be binding on the other court.” in the second sentence of Article 166 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure no. 6100

- The contested provision stipulates that where there is a connection between cases brought before civil courts of the same level and status within the same judicial district, the decision on joinder rendered by the court where the second case is filed shall be binding on the other court.

- It was maintained that the binding nature of such joinder decisions precludes any effective review, thereby violating the principle of the natural judge, the right of access to a court, the principle of the rule of law, and the independence of courts.

- The Court reiterated that the principle of the natural judge requires not only that courts be established by law, but also that jurisdictional rules determining which court will hear a case be laid down clearly and in advance, preventing the reassignment of cases after a dispute has arisen.

- Although mechanisms such as the joinder of cases may pursue legitimate aims, including procedural economy, the expeditious conduct of proceedings and the prevention of contradictory judgments, any rule allowing a case to be heard by a court other than the one originally seized must be accompanied by sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness.

- The contested provision allows a binding joinder decision to be rendered by the court where the second case is filed, without providing any corrective or review mechanism in cases where the conditions for joinder are not met, and without enabling the case to be returned to the court that would normally have jurisdiction.

- As a result, the provision enables the irreversible change of the competent court and judge after the dispute has arisen, solely on the basis of a binding joinder decision, even where such decision might be inconsistent with law.

- The Court found that this situation undermines the principle of the natural judge, as it allows the determination of the court and judge after the emergence of the dispute, without effective safeguards.

- Consequently, the contested provision has been found unconstitutional and therefore annulled.

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Muammer Bulut

2020/9066

21 November 2024

(Plenary)

Violation of the right to property, safeguarded by Article 35 of the Constitution

- Alleged violation of the right to property on account of the failure to ensure the advance payment of the real value of the expropriated immovable property, contrary to the constitutional safeguard.

- The General Directorate of Highways expropriated 439.68 m² of the applicant’s immovable property and initiated judicial proceedings for the determination and registration of the expropriation compensation.

- The civil court of first instance determined the compensation on the basis of expert reports excluding the value of certain structures, despite the applicant’s objections, and ordered the registration of the expropriated part in the name of the administration.

- Upon appeal, the Court of Cassation quashed the decision, holding that the value of the structures extending into the expropriated area had to be included in the compensation.

- Following renewed expert examinations, the compensation was increased; however, the administration failed to pay the determined amount within the prescribed time-limit, leading the trial court to dismiss the case on procedural grounds.

- Under Expropriation Law no. 2942, registration decisions are final, while appellate review is confined to the determination of compensation, resulting in the transfer of ownership before the real value is finally determined and paid.

- In the present case, the applicant was deprived of his immovable property before the real value of the compensation had been finally determined and paid in full, in breach of the advance payment guarantee enshrined in Article 46 of the Constitution.

- The Court held that the interference did not comply with Articles 13, 35 and 46 of the Constitution.

- Consequently, the Constitutional Court found a violation of the right to property.

Cem Özberk

2020/15944

20 March 2025

(Plenary)

Violation of the right to protection of personal data within the scope of the right to respect for private life, safeguarded by Article 20 of the Constitution

- Alleged violation of the right to protection of personal data within the scope of the right to respect for private life, due to the fact that the criminal proceedings into the unlawful disclosure of personal health data had not been conducted effectively.

- The applicant’s psychiatrist disclosed a report containing sensitive information about the applicant’s treatment process to the applicant’s mother, without the applicant’s knowledge or consent, several years after the treatment had ended.

- The applicant alleged that this disclosure breached medical confidentiality and was subsequently used against him in guardianship proceedings, while criminal proceedings initiated against the psychiatrist resulted in an acquittal.

- The trial court considered that the disclosure had been made with the intention of protecting the applicant and that no criminal intent could be established.

- The Constitutional Court observed that the disclosure went beyond mere informing, as a report containing sensitive health data relating to an adult was handed over to a third party, notwithstanding the applicant’s alleged conflict of interest with his mother.

- The trial court failed to assess whether the disclosure of the document was necessary and proportionate, whether there was an urgent or compelling reason justifying it, and whether less intrusive alternatives were available.

- The Court held that the domestic courts did not provide relevant and sufficient reasoning compatible with the safeguards required under Article 20 of the Constitution, and that this deficiency was not remedied on appeal.

- Accordingly, the Constitutional Court concluded that the State had failed to fulfil its positive obligations and found a violation of the right to protection of personal data within the scope of the right to respect for private life.

FYA Turizm İnşaat İthalat İhracat Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.

2020/2697

12 December 2024

(Plenary)

No violation of the right to property, safeguarded by Article 35 of the Constitution

- Alleged violation of the right to property arising from the cancellation of the final allocation process of a public immovable property designated for the construction of a tourism facility.

- The applicant company was granted a preliminary permission and subsequently a final allocation for the use of public property for tourism purposes; however, following the suspension and later resumption of the allocation period, it failed to submit the required updated undertaking and guarantee.

- On this ground, the administration cancelled the final allocation and recorded the letter of guarantee as revenue, considering that the company had breached the allocation conditions.

- While the administrative court annulled the impugned act, the Council of State quashed the decision and dismissed the case, holding that the cancellation was lawful under the applicable legislation.

- The Constitutional Court observed that the interference with the applicant’s right to property had a clear, accessible and foreseeable legal basis, notably Article 8 of the Tourism Promotion Law no. 2634 and Article 17 § 7 of the relevant Regulation.

- The Court further held that the allocation, supervision and cancellation mechanisms pursued a legitimate public interest, namely the effective and timely development of tourism investments contributing to the national economy.

- In assessing proportionality, the Court found that requiring the applicant to update the undertaking and guarantee following the suspension of the allocation period did not impose an excessive burden and served to maintain a fair balance between the public interest and the applicant’s property interests.

- Accordingly, the Constitutional Court found no violation of the right to property.

Ferihan Beyoğlu

2020/20382

9 January 2025

(Plenary)

Violation of the right to right to an effective remedy safeguarded by Article 40 of the Constitution, in conjunction with the right to the protection and improvement of one’s corporeal and spiritual existence safeguarded by Article 17 of the Constitution

- Alleged violation of the right to an effective remedy, in conjunction with the right to the protection and improvement of one’s corporeal and spiritual existence, due to the failure to provide full redress for damage arising from medical negligence.

- The applicant, who became paralysed following a surgical operation allegedly attributable to the administration’s negligence, brought a full remedy action seeking pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages together with statutory interest.

- During the proceedings, the amount of pecuniary damage was increased on the basis of an expert report; however, the Council of State held that interest on the increased amount should accrue only from the date when the petition for increase was served on the administration.

- As a result, interest on the increased compensation was calculated from a significantly later date, despite the damage arising from the same administrative act, leading to a loss of value in the applicant’s compensation.

- The Constitutional Court observed that this interpretative approach deprived the applicant of a genuine opportunity for full redress and rendered ineffective, in practice, the statutory mechanism introduced to ensure the right to an effective remedy.

- The Court further noted that there was no legislative provision requiring such a distinction in the determination of the starting date of interest.

- Accordingly, the Constitutional Court found a violation of the right to an effective remedy, in conjunction with the right to the protection and improvement of the applicant’s corporeal and spiritual existence.

N.E. (2022/62466)

A.S. (2023/30928)

Halit İncirlioğlu (2023/38006)

29 May 2025

(Plenary)

No violation of the right to right to respect for private life safeguarded by Article 20 of the Constitution, read in conjunction with Article 15

Violation of the right to respect for private life in the application lodged by Halit İnciroğlu

- The applicants N.E. and A.S., serving as public prosecutors, and Halit İnciroğlu, serving as a judge, were dismissed from office by decisions of the Plenary of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (CJP) on the ground that they had a relation or connection with the FETÖ/PDY.

- The applicants’ requests for review of the dismissal decisions were rejected by the CJP.

- Actions for annulment brought before the Fifth Chamber of the Council of State were dismissed, and the subsequent appeals lodged with the Plenary Session of the Chambers for Administrative Cases were also rejected.

- The applicants claimed that their dismissal from office on account of an alleged relation or connection with the FETÖ/PDY violated their right to respect for private life.

- They further complained of the excessive length of the administrative proceedings.

- The applicant Halit İnciroğlu additionally alleged a violation of the presumption of innocence.

As regards the applicants A.S. and N.E.

- The applicants were dismissed during the state of emergency on the basis of their established use of the ByLock application, which was regarded as indicating a relation or connection with the FETÖ/PDY.

- The Court reiterated that identifying and dismissing members of the judiciary with such ties constituted a measure strictly required by the exigencies of the state of emergency, given their duty of loyalty to the democratic constitutional order.

- The use of ByLock, obtained through intelligence operations against a terrorist organisation threatening national security, was considered sufficient, serious and convincing evidence, without the need to examine additional proof.

- Accordingly, the Court held that the interference with the applicants’ right to respect for private life complied with Article 15 of the Constitution and found no violation of Article 20.

As regards the applicant Halit İnciroğlu

- The applicant’s dismissal was based on a witness statement lacking concrete factual support and on a presumption arising from his appointment to a senior position during a period when the FETÖ/PDY was influential within the judiciary.

- The Court stressed that the existence of a relation or connection with a terrorist organisation must be demonstrated through a comprehensive and coherent assessment of concrete facts and evidence, including the defence submissions.

- In the present case, the decisive witness statement consisted mainly of personal impressions, the presumption regarding the applicant’s appointment was unsupported by objective evidence, and exculpatory statements were not duly examined.

- Consequently, the Court found that the authorities failed to provide relevant and convincing reasons, and that the interference was not strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, thus finding a violation of the right to respect for private life under Articles 20 and 15 of the Constitution.

Case

Decision

Case-Law Development

Related

E. 2024/234

22 April 2025

(Plenary)

Annulment of Article 56 § 1 of the Civil Servants Law no. 657, amended by Article 21 of Law no. 2670, insofar as it concerns the phrase “…whose conduct and behaviour … are found to be incompatible with public service …”

- The contested provision stipulates that civil servants serving in the capacity of probationary officers may be dismissed from public service upon the proposal of their disciplinary supervisor and the approval of the appointing authority, in the event that their conduct and behaviour during the candidacy period is found to be incompatible with public service.

- It is argued that the contested provision, despite prescribing a severe consequence such as dismissal from public service, does not specify the type and nature of the conducts or behaviours that are incompatible with public service, thereby leading to arbitrary interpretations and practices.

- Pursuant to Article 13 of the Constitution, fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted only by law. Any law restricting fundamental rights must not exist merely in a formal sense; legal provisions must also be formulated with sufficient clarity, accessibility, and foreseeability so as to prevent arbitrariness.

- The contested provision does not clearly and precisely regulate the scope, nature, or manner of the acts which constitute grounds for dismissal. Therefore, it fails to provide individuals, within a legal framework, with a sufficient degree of clarity and precision to foresee which specific conducts and behaviours may lead to such a consequence.

- Consequently, the contested provision has been found unconstitutional and thus annulled.

E.2024/93

22 April 2025

(Plenary)

Dismissal of the request for annulment of Article 29 § 4 of the Law no. 7269 on Precautions to be Taken and Assistance to be Provided due to Disasters Affecting Public Life, insofar as it concerns the phrases “or her/his spouse…” and “… in the same area…”

- The contested provision stipulates that in areas where buildings are burned, severely damaged, or are at risk of such damage, or which must be expropriated pursuant to zoning plans, if either the husband or the wife, within a family residing there, owns another undamaged and independent building or flat of the same type in the same area, her/his spouse shall not be entitled to benefit from the housing assistance or credit facilities provided under the same law.

- It is argued that depriving an individual of the benefits provided by the Law solely on the ground that her/his spouse owns an undamaged property is not compatible with the right to property; that such a situation is likely to lead to unjust treatment in the event of divorce; and that the contested provision grants a broad discretion to the administration in determining entitlement to rights.

- According to the Court, the impugned measure that constitutes a social assistance envisaged under Article 29 of the Law aims at addressing the urgent housing needs of families who have been deprived of shelter due to disasters.

- It falls within the discretion of the law-maker to give priority to families who have been entirely deprived of housing, with the aim of restoring normal living conditions as swiftly as possible in areas where a disaster has occurred or is likely to occur. Accordingly, the contested provision complies with the State’s positive obligations stemming from the right to housing.

- Consequently, the contested provision has been found constitutional, and therefore the request for its annulment has been dismissed.

E.2024/240

22 April 2025

(Plenary)

Annulment of subparagraph 2 (c) of Article 7 § 1 of Law no. 4760 on Special Consumption Tax, amended by Article 21 of Law no. 5228, insofar as it concerns the phrase “…by disabled and handicapped persons who have a vehicle specially equipped with driving equipment adapted to their disability for their personal use”

- The contested provision stipulates that among disabled and handicapped persons with a disability rating below 90%, only those who can present a medical board report attesting that they can operate the purchased vehicle through the installation of special driving equipment adapted to their disability may benefit from the special consumption tax exemption upon initial purchase of the vehicle.

- It is argued that the contested provision contradicts the State’s positive obligation to take measures to protect persons with disabilities and to ensure their integration into society, which is in breach of the principles of the social state and equality; and that it falls foul of the international treaties concerning the protection of the rights of persons with disabilities.

- The provision prevents disabled and handicapped persons, who have been deemed ineligible to obtain a driving licence due to their health-related limitation, from benefiting from the relevant exception, even in cases where the use of a specially adapted vehicle could otherwise enable them to drive.

- Thus, it cannot be said that personal circumstances of disabled and handicapped persons with a disability rating below 90%, who nevertheless lack the necessary physical and mental capacity to operate a vehicle and are therefore unable to obtain a driving licence, have been duly taken into account.

- Besides, this difference in treatment resulting from the contested provision has no objective and reasonable ground, thus infringing the principle of equality.

- Consequently, the contested provision has been found unconstitutional and thus annulled.

Case

Decision

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Ömer Oral
2023/33667

9 January 2025 (Plenary)

Violation of the right to access to a court within the scope of the right to a fair trial safeguarded by Article 36 of the Constitution

-Alleged violation of the said right due to the applicant’s inability to exercise the right to appeal, as the appellate review had not been conducted in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.

- The applicant, who had been tried by the incumbent assize court for various offences, was convicted of some of these offences whereas acquitted of the remaining ones.

- On the applicant’s request for an appeal on points of facts and law, which was examined without holding a hearing by the criminal chamber of the Regional Court of Appeal (criminal chamber), the criminal chamber partially quashed the first-instance decision and dismissed the appeal request on the merits insofar as it related to certain offences. At the end of the retrial conducted following the quashing decision, the applicant was sentenced to imprisonment for certain offences. His subsequent request for appeal was dismissed on the merits, with no right of appeal, by the criminal chamber. His subsequent requests for a cassation appeal against the final decision was also dismissed.

- In Article 280 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure no. 5271, the decisions that may be issued by the criminal chambers of the regional court of appeal following an examination of the case-file are divided into four categories: “dismissal of the appeal request on the merits”, “dismissal of the appeal request on the merits with a minor amendment”, “quashing of the decision” and “remittal of the case for retrial”.

- The circumstances under which the criminal chambers may decide to quash the first-instance decisions are listed exclusively in Article 280 § 1 (e) and (f) of Code no. 5271.

- The quashing of the decision by the criminal chamber for a ground other than those exclusively listed in Code no. 5271 entails significant consequences for the applicant. In the present case, the criminal chamber should have decided on the case by holding a hearing under Article 280 § 1 (g) of Code. 5271 where it should have assessed the available evidence in the presence of the parties. It thus deprived the applicant of his right to oral proceedings before the regional court of appeal and other related procedural safeguards, along with his right to access to a court.

- In the light of these findings, the Court has concluded that the criminal chamber caused an interference -lacking a proper legal basis- with the applicant’s right to access to a court.

- Consequently, the Court has found a violation of the right to access to a court within the scope of the right to a fair trial.

E. 2024/169

6 March 2025

(Plenary)

Annulment of Article 3 § 2 of Law no. 1567 on the Protection of the Value of Turkish Currency, amended by Article 1 of Law no. 5827

- The contested provision stipulates that in case of unauthorised import or export of certain assets, which does not constitute a criminal offence or a misdemeanour under the provisions of Law no. 5607, an administrative fine shall be imposed on the individual in the amount of the market value of the goods and assets in question, or half of that amount in case of such attempted act.  

- It was maintained that the imposition of a fixed fine in case of such misdemeanour prevented courts from assessing the particular circumstances of a given case, thus granting no discretionary power to judges and failing to strike a fair balance between the legitimate aim pursued and the right to property.

- The unauthorised import or export of certain assets is an activity that must be subject to State control in order to safeguard public order and economic stability. By restricting the free movement of such goods, the State seeks to fulfil its obligation to protect both its economic security and the well-being of its citizens: serving a legitimate aim.

- The contested provision lays down, in a clear and foreseeable manner, the conditions, scope, and amount of the administrative fine, as well as the individuals to whom it applies: thus, satisfying the requirement of lawfulness.

- The Court has also reviewed the contested provision under the principle of proportionality.

- In its previous judgment Mohammad Atamleh (no. 2020/9691) in individual application, the Court examined the administrative sanction prescribed by the contested provision under the principle of proportionality and concluded that the sanction constituted a disproportionate interference with the right to property.

- In this judgment, Court has found that the contested provision leaves no room for the authorities to assess the degree of fault attributable to the person committing the misdemeanour, and nor does it allow the courts to assess whether the means employed to achieve the legitimate aim sought to be attained is tenable for the persons concerned, whether there is a lack of proportionality between the severity of the interference and the consequence thereof, and whether the consequence is fair.

- As regards the contested provision, the Court has found no reason to depart from its findings and conclusions in the case of Mohammad Atamleh. It has concluded that the provision leaves no room for the authorities to assess the degree of fault attributable to the person committing the misdemeanour, the source of the money, and the extent to which the legitimate aim sought to be protected by the provision has been impaired: placing an excessive burden on individuals.

- Consequently, the contested provision has been found unconstitutional and thus annulled.

Case

Decision

Case-Law Development

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Hasan Durmuş
2019/19126

23 January 2025 (Plenary)

Violation of the right to property safeguarded by Article 35 of the Constitution

-Alleged violation of the said right due to the insufficient compensation awarded for the annulment of his property title and its registration to the Treasury as forest land.

- A plot of land was registered in the applicant’s name in the land registry on 19 November 1990. However, on 15 May 2008, the General Directorate of Forestry brought an action seeking the annulment of the applicant’s title deed and the registration of the property in the name of the Treasury as forest land, on the grounds that the property had previously been forest and fell within the boundaries of a definitively demarcated forest area.  

- At the end of the proceedings before the inferior courts and the Court of Cassation, the State was found liable for the damage arising from the annulment of the title deed, and the applicant was awarded TRY 38,521.12 in pecuniary compensation. However, he was also ordered to pay TRY 11,383.43 as attorney’s fees to the defendant Treasury, in the name of which the property had been re-registered following the annulment of his title deed. This amount corresponds to approximately 29.55% of the compensation granted to him.

- This situation placed an excessive individual burden on the applicant, as it led to a significant decrease in the actual value of the property at the time of the interference: striking the fair balance between the applicant’s property rights and the requirements of the public interest underlying the interference.

- Consequently, the Court has found a violation of the right to property.

II. Constitutionality Review

E. 2025/50

6 March 2025

(Plenary)

Annulment of Articles 134 and 135 of Attorneys Act no. 1136, amended by Article 65 of Law no. 4667

- The contested provisions concern the disciplinary procedure and sanctions applicable to lawyers who have committed acts and behaviours inconsistent with the honour, order, traditions, and professional rules of the legal profession, as well as to those who have failed to perform their duties.

- It was maintained in brief that the contested provisions provided for no clear and precise principle as to the disciplinary practices and the types of sanctions applicable to specific disciplinary offenses and therefore granted unlimited discretionary power to the administration: infringing the principle of nullum cri- men nulla poena sine lege.

- In its previous decision no. E.2021/16, K.2021/62, dated 22 September 2021, the Court reviewed Article 30 of Law No. 6643 on the Turkish Pharmacists' Association, insofar as it concerned the disciplinary procedure and sanctions. The respective part was found unconstitutional and annulled, on the grounds that it failed to afford those concerned a clear and foreseeable legal framework as to the disciplinary acts or circumstances and the corresponding legal sanctions or consequences. The Court pointed to the lack of necessary and sufficient mechanisms to ensure a fair balance between these acts and the disciplinary sanctions, as well as of legal safeguards against arbitrary interpretation and application regarding the disciplinary sanctions.

- The Court found no reason to depart from its previous findings.

- Consequently, the contested provisions have been found unconstitutional and thus annulled.

Case

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Sani Bayar
2021/26642

21 November 2024

(Plenary)

Violation of the right to a reasoned decision within the scope of the right to a fair trial, safeguarded by Article 36 of the Constitution

-Alleged violation of the said right due to the failure of the authorities to address the claims capable of affecting the outcome of the proceedings.

- The trial court convicted the applicant of aggravated theft, violation of the inviolability of domicile, and damage to property, relying on evidence obtained through the interception of his communications.

- In accordance with the established case-law of the Court of Cassation, communication records incidentally obtained during the interception of telecommunications regarding offences not enumerated among the so-called “catalogue offences” cannot be lawfully admitted as evidence.

- The applicant appealed the decision, arguing that the impugned evidence was obtained unlawfully and therefore could not be relied on for his conviction.

- It is clear that the applicant’s claims concerning the unlawfulness and inadmissibility of incidentally obtained evidence constituted substantial claims, which could have affected the outcome of the proceedings.

- The appeal court failed to provide any explanation as to the reasons for departing from its earlier case-law.  

- Consequently, the Court has found a violation of the right to a reasoned decision within the scope of the right to a fair trial.

II. Constitutionality Review

E. 2024/135

16 January 2025 (Plenary)

Annulment of the third sentence added to Additional Article 1 § 1 of the Expropriation Law no. 2942 by Article 3 of Law no. 7421

- The contested provision stipulates that, as regards the immovable properties subject to legal restrictions on use in a manner that interferes with the essence of the right to property as being allocated for public services and government facilities under urban development plans, zoning plans or their implementation shall be carried out within five years from the entry into force of the implementation zoning plans, and such properties shall either be expropriated by the relevant authorities within budgetary means, or, in any event, the zoning plan shall be amended so as to eliminate the restrictions that prevent the exercise of property rights.

- It is argued that the provision envisaged the bringing of an action for claims related to property rights before the courts of law, whereas the issuance and implementation of zoning plans constituted administrative acts, thus maintaining that such actions should fall within the jurisdiction of the administrative courts. 

- Article 46 § 1 of the Constitution stipulates that expropriation may be carried out only on the condition that actual compensation is paid for the immovable property. In this respect, not only the awarding of compensation by the courts, but also the prompt payment of the awarded amount to the property owners is a requisite for putting an end to the unlawful interference.

- However, the contested provision alters the standard legal framework governing expropriation procedures, shifting the burden of litigation onto property owners whose land has been subjected to de facto expropriation.

- Any legal arrangement intended to regulate such interference with the right to property cannot be considered to meet the requirements of Article 46 in the absence of safeguards to prevent the registration of the property in the name of the administration without the awarded compensation being paid to the property owner.

- It has been thus concluded that the contested provision, which enables the administration to confiscate properties designated for public services in zoning plans without conducting formal expropriation and in a manner contrary to the respective principles set forth in the Constitution, is incompatible with the express wording of the Constitution.

- Consequently, the contested provision has been found unconstitutional and thus annulled.

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E.2024/66

5 November 2024

(Plenary)

Annulment of the phrase “…deaf and mute …” included in Article 250 § 12 and Article 251 § 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure no. 5271

- The contested provisions stipulate that accelerated and simplified trial procedures shall not be applied in cases where the suspect is deaf and mute.

- It is argued that the exclusion of deaf and mute individuals, who are in a disadvantaged position due to their physical disabilities, from the application of accelerated and simplified trial procedures deprives them of the opportunity to benefit from a criminal procedure mechanism that has an impact on substantive criminal law.

- The contested provisions contribute to the effective conduct of criminal proceedings regarding deaf and mute individuals under the age of twenty-one, thereby ensuring their protection and serving the public interest. However, it must also be assessed whether the distinction introduced by the provisions has reasonable and objective grounds for deaf and mute individuals who have reached the age of twenty-one.

- Pursuant to the contested provisions, if the accelerated trial procedure is not applied to deaf and mute individuals for their disability, they will be deprived of an opportunity for reduction in punishment by fifty percent, while the absence of the simplified trial procedure will result in the deprivation of an opportunity for reduction by twenty-five percent. In other words, a deaf and mute perpetrator over the age of twenty-one, who has full criminal liability, may be imposed more severe punishment than other perpetrators of the same act.

- Furthermore, accelerated and simplified trial procedures are applied to cases where there are no issues of credibility, are not complex, or do not require oral presentation of evidence, and which have not attained a certain threshold of severity. In such cases, a deaf and mute suspect/accused may be at a disadvantage compared to other suspects/accused.

- It has been concluded that there is no objective and reasonable ground for the distinction in the application of accelerated and simplified trial procedures between deaf and mute suspects/accused over the age of twenty-one and other suspects/accused over the age of eighteen.

- Consequently, the contested provisions have been found unconstitutional and thus annulled.

E.2023/158

5 November 2024

(Plenary)

Annulment of Article 27 § 1 of Law no. 5718 on International Private and Civil Procedure Law

- The contested provision prescribes that the parties to an employment contract shall be subject to the law of their own choosing, without prejudice to the minimum protection to be afforded to the employee pursuant to the imperative provisions of the law of the country where the employee performs the work.

- It is argued that the contested provision, which foresees the application of the law of the country where the respective place of work is located, to the disputes with respect to employees working at any foreign branch of a place of work, deprives the employee of his constitutional rights; and that as the Turkish employees working at foreign branches of the Türkiye-based companies are, in principle, subject to foreign law, they are not entitled to the rights enjoyed by the employees of the same company who are working in Türkiye, which falls foul of the principle of equality and the State’s obligation to protect the employees.

- Pursuant to Article 27 § 4 of Law no. 5718, in cases where the employment contract has not been made subject to the law of the parties’ own choosing and it is more closely affiliated with the law of another country, the law of that other country can be applied.

- However, if the parties have chosen the law to apply to their contracts, the law of any another country, which is more closely affiliated, can no longer be applicable.

- Besides, in choosing the applicable law, it is extremely difficult for the employee, who is the weaker party to the contract vis-à-vis the employer, to have a sufficient level of knowledge as to the content and scope of the respective foreign law and to foresee whether its application would be more favourable to him.

- Accordingly, the Court has noted that in choosing the applicable law, the employer may evade the obligations set forth in the law of another country, which is more closely affiliated, and the employee may be deprived of the protection afforded by that law.

- Thus, the contested provision which allows -in the absence of a chosen applicable law- for setting aside the rights to be enjoyed by the employee by making such a choice- fails to strike a reasonable balance in respect of employee-employer relationship and conflicts with the State’s positive obligation to protect the employees.

- Consequently, the contested provision has been found unconstitutional and thus annulled.

E.2023/123

4 December 2024

(Plenary)

Dismissal of the request for annulment of Additional Article 134 § 3 of the Enforcement and Bankruptcy Law no. 2004

- The contested provision stipulates that proportional fee shall be collected from the persons other than the creditor requesting the sale, the debtor, registered interested parties, and holders of limited real rights in order to submit a request for termination of a tender; that half of this fee must be paid in advance at the time of the request; that if the request is granted, the fee shall not be imposed on any other party and shall be refunded upon request; and that unless the request is granted, the fee already paid shall not be refunded, and the remaining portion of the fee shall collected from the party requesting the termination of the tender.

- The provision is claimed to be unconstitutional on the ground that it introduces a different practice to the detriment of the winner of the tender.

- The Court considers that the contested provision pursues a legitimate aim in terms of limiting the right of access to a court in order to prevent unfair requests for termination of the tender. The imposition of an extraordinary proportional fee for termination requests also prevents tender process being prolonged due to unnecessary applications.

- The impugned restriction has been found to be proportionate.

- Consequently, the contested provision has been found constitutional and therefore the request for its annulment has been dismissed.

E.2024/29

25 December 2024

(Plenary)

Annulment of Article 326 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure no. 6100, insofar as it concerns the phrase “actions for non-pecuniary damages”.

- The contested provision stipulates that if either party is partially justified in the case, the litigation costs shall be allocated between the parties according to the percentage method.

- It is argued that in the proceedings regarding actions for non-pecuniary damages, it is at the discretion of the trial judge to determine the amount of compensation, since there is no calculation method in place. In this sense, if the amount requested by the applicant is partly accepted, litigation costs will also be collected from him/her, which is in breach of the right of access to a court.

- In principle, a person who will bring an action for non-pecuniary damages cannot be expected to foresee the amount to be awarded at the end of the proceedings, namely the extent to which his/her claim will be justified.

- In actions for non-pecuniary damages, individuals who set their claims at a lower amount may suffer loss of rights. Additionally, if a portion of their claim is not granted at the judge’s discretion, they may be held liable for litigation costs under the contested provision. Therefore, the contested provision imposes a restriction on the right of access to a court.

- Consequently, the contested provision has been found unconstitutional and thus annulled.

E.2025/39

11 February 2025

(Plenary)

Annulment of the phrase “…when the final decision is issued by the first instance court or the regional administrative court…” in the first sentence of Additional Article 1 § 2 of Law no. 2577 on Administrative Procedure, which was amended by Article 54 of Law no. 7524

- The contested provision sets forth that in administrative actions, the subject-matter of which is below the monetary value on the date when the final decision is issued by the first instance court or the regional administrative court, no appeal can be lodged against decisions of these courts.

- It is argued that in instituting an action or seeking the amendment of the initial claim, the plaintiff cannot be reasonably expected to know the revaluation rate of the subsequent years and thus the monetary limit on the date of the decision, that a decision -which is in fact appealable by the date of the initial action or the action seeking an amendment- may not be appealable because of current monetary value limitations especially in case of prolongation of the proceedings and in periods of high inflation, which is in breach of the principles of legal certainty, predictability, as well as of a fair trial.

- In its decision no. E.2023/182, K.2024/203, the Court has already annulled a contested phrase laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure no. 6100, which stipulates that a decision issued by the first instance court or the regional court of appeal cannot be appealed against, if the value and amount of the claim, the subject-matter of the action, is below the monetary amount (limit) on the date of the decision. In annulling the phrase, the Court has noted that the entire burden caused by inflation was imposed on the parties, and the contested provision put a disproportionate burden on the right to appellate review of a decision. The phrase, which was already annulled by the Court, relates to judicial proceedings, whereas the contested phrase in the present case relates to administrative proceedings.  

- As for the present case, the Court sees no reason to depart from its findings and conclusion in its decision no. E.2023/182, K.2024/203, as the contested phrase may preclude the right to appellate review of a decision issued by the first instance court or the regional administrative court on the basis of the monetary limit to file an appeal.

-  Consequently, the contested phrase has been found unconstitutional and thus annulled.

Case

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Kadir Toprak
2022/2407

9 October 2024

(Plenary)

Violation of the right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of defence safeguarded by Article 36 of the Constitution

-Alleged violation of the said right due to rejection of defence counsel’s health-related excuse.

- The applicant was indicted for inflicting minor bodily harm while the COVID-19 pandemic had been ongoing. In the subsequent proceedings, the applicant’s defence counsel was unable to attend the second hearing for his health problems, which he specified in a letter of excuse.

- However, the aforementioned letter of the applicant’s defence counsel was rejected, and the applicant was imposed a judicial fine based on the final opinion of the public prosecutor on the merits.

- Presentation of the public prosecutor’s final opinion was undoubtedly a procedure that might have affected the outcome of the proceedings.

- In similar cases, the Court of Cassation has considered the rejection of the letter of excuse submitted by the applicant or her/his defence counsel as a restriction on the right to defence.

- It should be noted that it was not possible for the applicant’s defence counsel to substantiate his excuse at the time of submission, as the test results required a specific process to be finished.

- Considering the particular circumstances prevailing at the time of the proceedings, the court should have examined health-related excuses with a higher degree of scrutiny, without categorically dismissing them, regardless of they are substantiated or not.

- However, the court, dismissing the excuse of the applicant’s defence counsel, rendered its decision without allowing the applicant and his defence counsel to exercise their right to defence.

- Consequently, the Court has found a violation of the right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of defence within the scope of the right to a fair trial.

Kombassan Kağıt Matbaa Gıda ve Tekstil Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.

2019/30300

18 July 2024

(Second Section)

Violation of the right to access to a court, under the right to a fair trial, safeguarded by Article 36 of the Constitution

- Alleged violation of the right to access to a court due to the dismissal of the applicant’s request for an increase in the amount in dispute during the appellate proceedings within the scope of the full remedy action initiated with a specified claim.

- The applicant company, sought reimbursement of overpaid default interest concerning its immovable property for the years 2003–2005, which had been judicially determined to be subject to limited taxation, but its request was dismissed.

- Although the tax court ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered the reimbursement of TRY 500,000 along with accrued deferred interest, the applicant’s subsequent request to increase the amount in dispute was rejected by the Council of State, and the decision became final.

- In the present case, the court issued an interlocutory decision requiring the defendant administration to provide information on the default interest collected. Referring to the principle of being bound by the claim, the court annulled the impugned administrative act and ordered the reimbursement of the overpaid amount to the applicant.

-The administration’s response to the interlocutory decision, which contained critical information for the applicant’s claim, was not communicated to the applicant, who became aware of it only upon receiving the court’s judgment, thus preventing an earlier request for an increase in the impugned amount.

-Despite promptly submitting a petition to increase the amount upon learning the actual figures from the court’s reasoned decision, the applicant’s appeal was dismissed on the grounds that such a request could only be made before the inferior court’s judgment, which imposed an excessive burden on the applicant and disproportionately interfered with the right to access to a court.

- Consequently, the Court found a violation of the right to access to a court under the right to a fair trial.

E.2024/114

5 November 2024

(Plenary)

Dismissal of the request for annulment of the provision precluding the refund of organisation fee in case of termination of the savings finance contract after 14 days

- The contested provision, the second sentence of Article 39/A (4) of the Law no. 6361 on Financial Leasing, Factoring and Finance and Savings Finance Companies insofar as it concerns the phrase “… excluding the organisation fee…” thereof, stipulates that the organisation fee shall not be refunded if the customer terminates the savings finance contract after 14 days following the date of its signature.

- It is argued that the contested provision significantly restricts the customer’s right to terminate the contract as well as its financial independence, which is in breach of the State’s obligation to protect customers.

- The Court considers that the provision intends to take into consideration certain services provided by the company during the period set forth therein.

- If the customer was entitled to a refund of the organisation fee for an indefinite period of time, the company would suffer commercial difficulties given the investments it has made, personnel it has employed and various expenses it has made to this end.

- Therefore, imposition of a restriction on the customer’s ability to receive a refund of the organisation fee does not upset the fair balance between the interests of the parties.

- It has been concluded that the aforementioned provision does not impose an excessive burden on the customer, and that a fair balance has been struck between the conflicting interests of the parties.

- Consequently, the contested provision has been found constitutional and therefore the request for its annulment has been dismissed.

E.2021/78

5 November 2024

(Plenary)

Annulment of the provisions entrusting the administration with determining the principles and procedures regarding the transfer of pension commitment contracts to the private pension system

- The contested provisions grant the Insurance and Private Pension Regulation and Supervision Authority the power to determine the principles and procedures for the eligibility of members, including the age and duration requirements for obtaining pension rights, following the transfer of pension commitment contracts to the private pension system.

- It was claimed that the contested provisions were unconstitutional as they delegated to the administration the regulation of essential aspects of social security rights which must be regulated by law, thereby violating the principle of legality and the right to social security.

- The Court has observed that the contested provisions allowed the Authority to interfere with the contractual terms agreed upon between individuals and their institutions or employers by modifying the conditions for obtaining pension rights under the transferred contracts. This interference has been deemed as a restriction on the freedom of contract safeguarded by Article 48 of the Constitution.

- Furthermore, the contested provisions grant the Authority a broad discretionary power to determine the conditions for pension eligibility without establishing a legal framework, thereby subjecting individuals’ pension rights subject to administrative changes. The lack of legislative safeguards has been found to be incompatible with the principle of legality.

- The Court has concluded that the contested provisions violated constitutional safeguards, particularly regarding the freedom of contract and the principle of legality, and therefore annulled them. The annulment decision will enter into force nine months after its publication in the Official Gazette.

- Consequently, the contested provisions have been found unconstitutional and thus annulled.