Individual Application

The Facts

 In 2016, a national newspaper reported that at least ten students, staying in dormitories allegedly affiliated to a foundation and an association, had been subjected to molestation by a teacher in charge of the dormitory. As a consequence of these news reports, claims concerning a relationship of financial support between the plaintiff T., a company operating in the field of telecommunications and recognised by the public for its commercial activities in the field of communication, and the foundation were on the public agenda and became the subject of the news. Afterwards, the applicant shared a post on his social media account stating that “I have cancelled my 16-year contract with the paedophile sympathiser and censorship-supporter @....#....Boycott (Pedofili destekçisi ve sansürcü @... ile olan 16 yıllık sözleşmemi iptal ettirdim.#... @...Boykot)”, along with a screenshot showing that he had switched to another GSM operator. The plaintiff company brought an action for non-pecuniary compensation against the applicant before the civil court of first instance, alleging that its personal rights had been violated. At the end of the proceedings, the court ordered the applicant to pay TRY 500 as non-pecuniary compensation due to the phrase “paedophile sympathiser” included in the post. The applicant’s subsequent appeal against this decision was dismissed by the regional court of appeal.

The Applicant’s Allegations

The applicant maintained that the award of compensation against him on account of his social media post had been in breach of his freedom of expression.

The Court’s Assessment

In the present case, the social media post in question was shared at a time when the discussions on the alleged financial support were still ongoing and the public was highly interested in the issue. In this regard, it should be acknowledged that the expressions used had a factual basis. However, since the plaintiff is a private company with a legal entity, the labelling of “paedophile”, which is the subject matter of the present case, would constitute an unfair imputation only if it is directed towards a real person. Besides, the relevant expressions represent a value judgment.

The applicant addressed the public in a harsh and provocative manner, indicating that a commercial relationship with the plaintiff company would be tantamount to encouraging child abusers because of the plaintiff company’s support for the relevant foundation's campaign. As many previous judgments have emphasised, freedom of expression applies not only to information and ideas that are accepted or considered harmless or irrelevant by the society, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. In this sense, although the said expressions were disturbing, it is evident that they are intended to put pressure on the plaintiff by targeting the financial support relationship between the foundation and the plaintiff rather than the plaintiff’s commercial reputation. Therefore, it should be accepted that the applicant’s sole aim was to engage in offensive discourse through insult, and thus the relevant post fell within the protection of freedom of expression.

On the other hand, the plaintiff company made a public statement in response to the aforementioned news and allegations, explaining that the financial support in question was in the nature of educational scholarship and was provided for the education of students and not for the promotion of any foundation, association or non-governmental organisation, and did not make any statement contradicting the relevant news. In this regard, it is indisputable that the plaintiff is in a position to respond to the accusations against it, and that since it operates in the telecommunications field, it is in a more favourable position as regards the protection of its commercial reputation. Accordingly, the plaintiff, more than any other person, is obliged to endure such criticisms directed against it.

In conclusion, the trial courts failed to provide relevant and sufficient grounds for concluding that the impugned interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression met a pressing social need and complied with the requirements of a democratic society.

Consequently, the Court has found a violation of the freedom of expression.