Constitutionality Review

Contested Provision

The contested provision stipulates that where there is a connection between cases filed before civil courts of the same level and status within the same judicial district, a joinder decision rendered by the court before which the second case is filed shall be binding on the other court.

Ground for the Request for Annulment

It was maintained in brief that the contested provision precludes the review of the joinder decision rendered by the court where the case is filed, thereby violating the principle of the rule of law, the right of access to a court, the natural judge principle, as well as the principle of the independence of courts. On these grounds, the provision was claimed to be unconstitutional.

The Court’s Assessment

The natural judge principle requires that the establishment and jurisdiction of courts, as well as the procedural rules to be followed be regulated by law before the emergence of a dispute. Such a regulation ensures that the individual concerned knows in advance and with certainty the court where the case will be heard. This guarantee encompasses not only the determination of matters falling within the jurisdiction of the courts, but also all regulations concerning the organisation of the judiciary, including the establishment of each court and the determination of its territorial jurisdiction, thereby necessitating that the duties and powers of courts be defined in a clear and comprehensible manner.

In terms of procedural rules and regulations of a judicial body, regarding its establishment, duties, functioning, and procedural rules, to comply with the natural judge principle, it is not sufficient that such matters be regulated by law alone. The natural judge principle, which encompasses not only the requirement of legality but also that of prior determination, precludes the determination of judicial authorities or the designation of judges after a dispute has arisen; in other words, it prevents the designation of judges based on the identities of the parties to a given case.

On the other hand, the natural judge principle does not completely prohibit the conferral of jurisdiction on newly established or existing courts. Provided that it is not limited to a specific event, person, or group, the establishment of a new court or the conferral of jurisdiction on an existing court, and allowing it to adjudicate disputes that arose prior to the date on which it was vested with jurisdiction does not in itself constitute a violation of the aforementioned principle.

Pursuant to the relevant principle, the rules determining which court will hear a case must be laid down by law and in advance. Nevertheless, where there exist justified and reasonable grounds arising from other constitutional guarantees or from the State’s obligations, it is possible to make legal regulations allowing a case to be heard by a court other than the one before which it was initially brought. One of such regulations is the institution of joinder of cases. This institution has been introduced so as to ensure that the connected cases are heard more expeditiously and at lower cost, and to prevent contradictory judgments. In this regard, the institution of joinder of cases aims to ensure the completion of proceedings within a reasonable time and the delivery of equitable decisions.

In accordance with the relevant provision of the Code no. 6100, courts are authorised to sever cases in order to ensure the proper conduct of proceedings. In this case, the court rendering the severance decision continues to hear both cases. Accordingly, where a joinder decision has been rendered in the absence of the required conditions, even in the event of severance of the cases, the dispute that would ordinarily fall within the jurisdiction of another court will be adjudicated by the court before which the first case was filed.

Furthermore, it is stipulated that decisions on joinder of cases before the courts of the same level and status within the same judicial district may be challenged only in conjunction with the final judgment, and that such decisions do not, in themselves, constitute grounds for setting aside or quashing the judgment. In this scope, where a joinder decision has been rendered without the required conditions being met and there are no other grounds for quashing, it is not possible for the case file to be returned to the court before which the second case was filed.

In order for a provision, stipulating that the case shall be heard by a court other than the one before which it was initially brought, to be compatible with the natural judge principle, it must not only be based on constitutionally justified and reasonable grounds, but must also afford sufficient safeguards against arbitrary practices. In this regard, where a joinder decision is rendered by the court before which the second case was brought without the required conditions being met, effective safeguards capable of preventing arbitrariness and of setting aside such a joinder decision must be provided. However, it has been observed that the impugned provision does not offer any mechanism enabling the case file to be returned to the second court in the event of a joinder decision rendered in breach of procedural requirements.

The joinder of a case with another case pending before a court of the same level and status within the same judicial district results in a change of the court/judge hearing the case. According to the contested provision, given that the joinder decision is binding on the other court, the case may be heard by a different court/judge after the dispute has arisen. However, the provision does not prescribe any corrective mechanism to ensure the review of unlawful joinder decisions or to enable the return of the case file to the court that would ordinarily adjudicate it.

Accordingly, the fact that a binding joinder decision rendered by the court before which the second case was brought, despite the absence of the required conditions and being related to only a specific dispute, irreversibly results in the change of the court/judge competent to hear the case is incompatible with the natural judge principle.

Consequently, the contested provision has been found unconstitutional and therefore annulled.