PRESS RELEASE

1 April 2026

Press Release No: Constitutionality Review 8/26

Press Release concerning the Decision on the Provision Foreseeing the Pronouncement of Name Changes on the Portal of the Press Announcement Agency

The Constitutional Court, at its session dated 25 December 2025, found unconstitutional and annulled the phrase “…and the announcement on the portal of the Press Announcement Agency” in the first sentence of Article 27 § 2 of the Turkish Civil Code no. 4721, which was amended by Article 12 of Law no. 7532, and held that the relevant decision would be effective after nine months from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette (file no. E.2025/120).

Contested Provision

The contested provision stipulates the pronouncement of name changes on the portal of Press Announcement Agency (“Agency”).

Ground for the Request for Annulment

It was maintained in brief that the disputed provision is unconstitutional on the grounds that the announcement published on the Agency’s website regarding court-ordered name changes is accessible to the public, and that such an announcement renders the personal data, including the individual’s former and current names, parents' names, place of registration, and date of birth, publicly available, which may potentially faciliate the commission of offences through the exploitation of such data. It is further claimed that the announcement entails no legal consequences, since the statutory time-limit for aggrieved parties to challenge a name change runs from the date of discovery rather than the date of announcement. Furthermore, all contemporary processes are carried out through individuals’ identification number and, therefore, the announcement serves no essential purpose.

The Court’s Assessment

It is understood that the right to the protection of personal data safeguards individual’s rights and freedoms not only against data processing but against all forms of interference directed at such data. By requiring the announcement of a name change, which constitutes a piece of personal data, on the Agency’s portal, the contested provision imposes a restriction on the right to the protection of personal data.

Any restriction on the right to the protection of personal data undoubtedly places a burden on the individual concerned. If this burden is found to be excessive in relation to the aim pursued, the restriction must be deemed disproportionate. In this sense, any restriction with this right can be considered proportional only when any processing or use of personal data is strictly limited in scope to what is necessary for the intended purpose, and the data does not remain publicly accessible for longer than is required to achieve that purpose.

Neither the contested provision nor any other statutory provision specifies how long the announcement will remain on the portal of the Agency. It is clear that the law lacks the necessary safeguards to ensure that name change decisions remain published only for a reasonable period. Consequently, the indefinite public disclosure of name change decisions may have severe consequences for the interests of the individual whose personal data is becomes publicly available.

Furthermore, the contested provision prescribes the categorical announcement of all name change decisions, leaving judges without discretion to assess whether such decisions should be published in specific cases. In other words, judges issuing a name change decision are deprived of the opportunity to evaluate whether an announcement is appropriate based on the specific circumstances of the case and the underlying reasons for the name change in question. Indeed, in certain cases, there may exist a prevailing legal interest in withholding such changes from public disclosure. Consequently, it has been concluded that the blanket requirement to announce all decisions on name changes, combined with the absence of judicial discretion, may give rise to severe consequences for the individuals concerned.

In light of the foregoing, it has been concluded that the contested provision disrupts the reasonable balance between the public interest in achieving the legitimate aim pursued and the interests of individuals, thereby imposing a disproportionate restriction on the right to the protection of personal data.

Consequently, the contested provision has been found unconstitutional and therefore annulled in so far as it concerns the phrase in question.

This press release prepared by the General Secretariat intends to inform the public and has no binding effect.